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or only through regulated behaviour?
PETER J. BUCKLEY
Abstract: This paper explores the mechanisms by which corporations can contribute 
to society. It examines the roles of regulation and the autonomous contributions of 
corporations. The roles of incentives to managers to ‘do good’ and of corporate cul-
ture to foster social responsibility are considered. The investigation finds that modern 
corporations are bound by a web of rules and signals that both constrain and support 
action towards social goals. These include not only formal regulation, but also signals 
from consumers, compliance with standards, employee expectations, supplier 
demands, and pressures from civil society. Rules and signals vary by place and time 
and corporate social responsibility practices must evolve with these pressures from 
stakeholders.  
Keywords: Corporate strategy, corporate social responsibility (CSR), regulation, 
stakeholders, corporate culture.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Can corporations contribute directly to society of their own volition or do they need 
to be constrained by regulation into contributing beyond their own corporate goals, 
such as profit, growth, or market share? What might be the best mechanism for an 
‘autonomous’ or non-regulated contribution?
The author suggests two potential mechanisms: the creation of incentives for key 
executives to contribute to societal values, represented by, for example, the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the creation of a company 
 culture where societal values are built into corporate decision-making.
The research process revealed that corporations—defined as the legal entity—are 
not only constrained by regulations and their own business models, but also by a 
changing web of signals and rules that emanate not just from government but from 
many aspects of civil society. The mechanisms by which corporations can and do 
 contribute to society are rich and varied, but a small-scale survey for the research 
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supported the case for social goals to be included more generally in corporations’ 
objectives.
The paper examines the way corporations contribute to society through three 
 juxtapositions: regulation versus autonomous social action, compliance versus initia-
tive, and regulatory authority versus good governance. It considers Lundan’s (2018) 
three varieties of pro-social behaviour from the ‘minimalist’—the idea that ‘the 
 business of business is business’ and ‘doing good by being good’—to the acceptance 
of ‘burdensome responsibility’, where the corporation commits to positive social 
change, even at a cost to its corporate profits. 
The evolving concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) lies in between, 
implemented either as an add-on, or as a shared value which the corporation may 
promote through its social goals. CSR may not impose costs on the business, but it 
may also fail to address major challenges effectively. The outliers to this spectrum are 
social enterprises and principled organisations. 
The author sets out and compares three policy models by which corporations do 
or may contribute to society. The received policy is based on a top-down system of 
compliance. An international body sets the moral basis for a policy which is then 
implemented by national governments through treaties and agreements. Corporations 
then adjust their decisions to adhere to the policy. 
In contrast, a direct policy model, implemented through proactive strategies, 
would start from the same international guidelines, but the objectives would be 
 embedded in the strategic decisions of corporations, either through executive’s 
 incentives or corporate culture. The model for social enterprises is different, starting 
with their mission, which underpins strategic and sustainable economic or social 
goals. The outcome is a trade-off  between sustaining business and achieving the goals.
Modern corporate governance means balancing authority and responsibility, 
through the ownership and organisational and capital structure of the corporation, 
and then through boards and directors. Debt or equity financing, the influence of 
large shareholders, standards, codes of conduct, other internal and external 
 stakeholders, and the overall reputation of the firm all shape whether and how a 
 corporation contributes directly to society. But these factors may still not be enough.
The paper argues that government regulation for pro-social activity among 
 corporations solves the governance problem, in that firms need no further justification 
for diverting resources, and also the problem of competitive dynamics, since each firm 
knows all others will have to bear the costs of compliance. Proactive and forward- 
looking firms might enjoy a lower cost than lagging firms, but regulation helps level 
the playing field. To be administered effectively, regulation needs accurate, timely 
information, and the paper argues that firms can and should contribute to the common 
good by contributing that information.
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Examining the case for and against corporations seeking social goals highlights 
market failures, distortions, and inequalities. The lack of government regulation and 
legal standards means that purchasing powers, the outcome of income inequalities, 
may determine what constitutes corporate social responsibility, and how it is supported. 
The author suggests that regulation is an essential element to ensure the welfare of 
those who are disenfranchised.
I INTRODUCTION
Purpose
This project examines the means by which corporations can contribute to society. It 
began by asking two nested questions. (1) Can corporations contribute to societal 
goals through their own volition or do they need to be constrained by regulation 
into contributing beyond their own selfish goals (profit, market shares, growth)? (See 
Table 1.) (2) What is the best mechanism for an ‘autonomous’ (non-regulated) con-
tribution? Two potential mechanisms are: (a) the creation of incentives for key 
 executives to contribute to societal values and (b) the creation of a company culture 
that is aligned with the greater good of society. (See Table 2.)
Two schematic diagrams (Figures 1 and 2) illustrate processes whereby corporations 
can contribute to societal goals. Figure 1 is the ‘conventional’ policy implementation 
and corporate response model, whereby corporations comply with societal goals 
driven by governmental regulations (at local, national, regional (EU), or global levels). 
Figure 2 represents an alternative direct, self-driven, ‘autonomous’ implementation of 
societal goals through corporate agency and action.
The second research question concerns the mechanism by which direct imple-
mentation is best achieved. The key mechanisms are: (a) incentives to executives to 
Table 1. The contribution of corporations to society.
Regulation versus autonomous social action
Compliance versus initiative
Regulatory authority versus good governance
Table 2. The ‘spontaneous’ contribution of corporations to society: the mechanism.
(a) Incentives to managers to achieve social goals
(b) The creation of a corporate culture centred on social goals
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Figure 1. The received policy model—corporations constrained by policy to contribute to society 
 (‘compliance’) (source: author).
1 International bodies (e.g., UN) set moral basis for policy agenda
2 This is implemented in national government policies, on regulations and incentives and:
2a Is transmitted through international (regional, special-interest) treaties and agreements
3 Economic actors including multinational corporations respond to these policy   
 initiatives by adjusting their decision making. 
4 Outcome:
Direct policy results
and
Unintended consequences
Figure 2. Potential (direct) policy model—implementation through direct corporate action (‘proactive 
strategies’) (source: author).
1 International bodies (e.g., UN) promulgate objectives
2  These objectives are embedded in strategic decisions of corporations through 
 (a) an incentive systems for executives and/or (b) a change in corporate culture.
 (a) Incentives (b) Culture
3 Outcome:
Direct policy results
and
Unintended consequences
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motivate them to comply with societal goals, such as the UN’s ‘Sustainable 
Development Goals’, or (b) the creation of a corporate culture such that societal 
 values are built into corporate decision-making. These mechanisms may be 
 complements or substitutes. 
The research process broadened these initial research questions. It became 
 apparent that corporations are not only constrained by regulation and by their own 
business models, but also by a web of  signals and rules that emanate not just from 
government but from many aspects of  civil society. The mechanisms by which corpor-
ations can, and do, contribute to society are rich and varied. This is reinforced by the 
small-scale survey of  fourteen key executives (see the Appendix) whose comments 
are included in this report. The numbers following the quote refer to the respondents 
(listed in the Appendix).1
In general, the companies interviewed supported the case for social goals to be 
included in their objectives, as the following quotes show. Indeed one US executive 
criticised the implication of ‘selfish’ goals in the question. However, there is some 
objection to the generalisation that ‘regulation’ is necessary and this raises issues 
about the type, context, and efficacy of ‘regulation’.
I also agree that corporations can and do put together a business case for Corporate 
Social Responsibility and this is especially so if their activities under CSR can be aligned 
with their own business interests. A prime example of such alignment is the drive by 
Coca-Cola around the world to invest in clean water as such activities are in alignment 
with the need for Coke to have local clean water in order to manufacture and sell its 
product. (7)
I believe corporations can contribute and that many indeed do so. … While these 
 companies have many stakeholders to appease, they also look at societal issues as part of 
their mission and values. (8)
It is sad and misleading to read the statement about corporations having ‘selfish’ goals, 
as if corporations are thoughtless individuals instead of organisations. Corporations 
employ people and, if industrial companies, they sustain many—sometimes hundreds or 
thousands—of families through suppliers and other value-chain networks. To call their 
goals ‘selfish’, brands all corporations with the stereotype of a few rotten corporate 
apples (which also exist in government, by the way); to do so perpetuates a harmful 
myth, very unfair to the many conscientious corporations that do good in the world. (9)
I believe the answer to both questions is a ‘yes’. Some businesses, especially consumer- 
facing businesses clearly feel the pressure of the expectations from their consumer base 
that they should at a minimum do no harm to society. Their corporate reputation improves 
1 Criteria for inclusion in the sample of firms: (1) seniority; (2) responsibility (at some stage) for CSR 
issues in company; (3) availability and willingness to be interviewed.
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if they are seen as doing good for the society. These market forces naturally push the 
businesses to think about their societal impact and address the issues. The answer to the 
question is a yes for such companies for the reason that the consumers of some businesses 
put such pressures on them. The pressure could also come from NGOs or other players 
(activists, media, etc.) as well. To the extent this is felt as a threat to the business, the 
business will act to address it. (11)
I do not agree that businesses should be regulated to contribute to society. Regulation is 
needed at various levels. I believe we should have standards on water discharge,  emissions, 
fundamental rights of the employees, etc. These are types of regulation that is already 
there to control the environmental and social footprint print of a business. (11)
Businesses with an enlightened self-interest, which take a long-term view that their 
 existence depends in the existence of the societies in which they live will contribute to 
invest in their future, but such thinking isn’t too commonplace. This is a matter of 
 leadership and culture, a strong tone at the top and walking the talk. The culture need not 
be an altruistic one, it needs to be an enlightened one as mentioned above. If incentives 
are connected to such existential philosophy, they could be effective. (11)
The corporation
‘The corporation’ is here taken as a firm—a legal entity. (This includes both private 
and public companies.) As Casson (2016: 157) points out, economic activity does not 
require firms; it simply requires that specific individuals control assets or resources 
and can take account of other individual’s plans when taking decisions. Firms are 
legal entities, controlled by individuals. They are legal constructs controlling a nexus 
of contracts that enable the organisation of risky team activities.
‘The strategy of the firm’ can be taken as set out by the chief executive officer 
(CEO) and endorsed by the board of directors. Firms are established by people 
 (entrepreneurs) who have an idea and set up the future legal entity of the firm to 
achieve their mission. This mission is often taken to be to make a profit, but may 
include ‘social’ goals (including environmental improvement, help to socially disad-
vantaged groups, providing goods and services to meet a social need, or generating 
income for a charitable or social purpose).
The advantages of firms are:
• Longevity beyond the life of the founders.
• Tax advantages.
• Limited liability protects the owners’ personal assets.
• As a nexus of contracts, firms can employ workers and sell products under 
their own name—these contracts do not have to be renegotiated if  the founder 
dies.
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• Firms act as a pool of capital for backers. They can hire capital from multiple 
sources. Shareholders spread financial risks and insure the firm against  external 
volatility. 
• Shares can be bought and sold, providing owners with personal liquidity and 
freeing their wealth from being tied up in perpetuity. 
(derived from Casson 2016:158)
II THE SOCIAL PURPOSE OF CORPORATIONS
The classification of pro-social behaviour utilised here differs from that of Schwartz 
and Caroll’s (2008) view of ‘business and society’ that suggested five frameworks—
Corporate Social Responsibility, Business Ethics, Stakeholder Management, 
Sustainability, and Corporate Citizenship, although all these aspects are covered in 
this paper. 
Three varieties of pro-societal behaviour
Three varieties of pro-social behaviour can be identified (Lundan 2018): 
1. The classic win–win case of doing good by being good. This would include the 
creation of employment as a social contribution. 
2. Social responsibility activities (CSR) that do not impose substantial costs on 
the business, but also arguably do not address the major societal challenges. 
Making a social contribution may also be a way of effectively competing and 
differentiating the firm from its rivals, as we see below. It should also be noted 
that spending on CSR reduces spending on other corporate activities such as 
R&D and marketing and, in this sense, its cost–benefit effectiveness should be 
judged against these alternative outlets for spending. 
3. ‘Burdensome responsibility’: cases where substantial costs are associated with 
socially responsible activities (Lundan 2018). 
For the first two categories, the motivation of the firm’s owners or top  management 
is sufficient for pursuing the social activities. 
For the third category, where substantial social benefits can be had, but only at a 
non-trivial cost to the business, the only viable way to bring about action is through 
government regulation. The firms’ CSR activities are complementary and necessary, 
but not substitutes for government regulation.
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Government regulation solves two interrelated problems:
1. It solves the governance problem in the sense that profit-making enterprises do 
not have to justify why they are diverting substantial resources to non-productive 
aims. 
2. It solves the problem of competitive dynamics, meaning that firms will not 
hesitate to make the necessary investments because they are assured that other 
firms in the industry will face similar investments and time frames. 
In this case, proactive and forward-looking firms might still enjoy a lower cost of 
compliance than lagging firms, but regulation helps to level the playing field.
Effective regulation is information-dependent. In order to be administered 
 effectively, regulation is an information-intensive activity, and much of the relevant 
information in today’s global economy is private information held by firms. Control 
of ‘private’ information by companies is an increasing difficulty, not only in policy 
formulation and implementation. Consequently, aside from their CSR activities, firms 
can/should contribute to the common good by contributing the information that is 
necessary for effective regulation. In the area of environmental regulation, for instance, 
this means that private firms (usually dominant MNEs (multinational enterprises)) 
develop the technologies which then become best-practice models for abatement 
 technologies or process redesign. In such cases, the relationship between firms and 
regulators has already shifted from command-and-control to some type of negotiated 
regulation.
The relevant information is private, and necessitates cooperation:
• The interconnectedness and complexity of markets and technologies mean 
that even more private information is needed than before. 
• This is particularly the case in the new areas of the digital economy related to 
how firms collect, process, and disseminate information and how they influence 
consumers and citizens. 
   This creates a need for a new way to balance the competitive interests of 
firms in shielding their technological and organisational knowledge and 
the need on the part of regulators to have access to (parts of) this 
information.
Burdensome responsibility is burdensome not only because it increases costs for 
firms, but also because it necessitates responsible participation in the regulatory 
 process (Lundan 2018).
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Transparency
Schackenberg and Tomlinson (2016) review the literature on organisation–stakeholder 
relationships and utilise the following definition:
Transparency is the perceived quality of intentionally shared information from a 
sender (2016: 1788). 
Its key role is in creating, maintaining, or repairing trust in the organisation. 
Reporting guidelines such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the 
Sustainable Accounting Standards Board (SASB) are a beginning towards a more 
complete reporting requirement. 
Corporate social responsibility
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a concept that attempts to bring a broader 
ethical understanding to the topic of business organisation. CSR refers to the idea 
that businesspeople should consider the social consequences of economic actions 
when making decisions; that there should be a bias towards decisions that have both 
good economic and social outcomes. (For a systematic review, see Pisani et al. (2017).)
The value of CSR has, nevertheless, been questioned: ‘It is an error to suppose 
that profit-seeking, as such, fails to advance the public good, and that special efforts 
to give something back to society are needed to redeem it’ (The Economist 2005). 
Several executives took the view that either market forces or societal pressure make 
social objectives necessary for business sustainability. 
Market forces will force industry to adopt societal goals. (1)
We have an unwavering focus on our [employee] health programme—it has paid for 
itself. (3) 
Government bureaucracies would probably not effectively carry out a regulatory frame-
work for ‘constraining’ corporations in this way; and I fear that the ‘law of unintended 
consequences’ would play out were such bureaucracies created and given a mandate. (7) 
Again, the absolute best mechanism for a self-directed contribution is to discover and 
implement actions which align the interests of the corporation with the interests of 
 society such as the clean water initiative which has been made a part of the culture of 
Coca-Cola. (7)
CSR gives access to pockets of the market—revenue opportunities, particularly in 
Europe. (13)
Most famously the Nobel laureate Milton Friedman (1970) argued that in a free 
society, ‘there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources 
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and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the 
rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without 
deception or fraud.’ Several interviewees commented on this proposition:
The Friedman position is wrong—businesses should be pro-social and wealth creating. 
(4)
Profits are like a social licence to operate. (4)
A shift is going on in business and investment focus—away from a transactional world 
view to a relationship world view. (4)
CSR is normally confined to the minimal level required to be able to make claims 
publicly about doing good to society, rather than genuinely wanting to have a large 
and extensive effect. Social impact can be an unintended externality rather than an 
explicit goal. 
If  we accept the premise that a complete set of competitive markets will bring 
forth private firms which, by working for private profit, work for the social good, then 
corporations naturally can and will contribute to society. There will be no external-
ities. A well-known manifestation of this world view is that of Milton Friedman, who 
is famous for saying ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to increase its profits’ 
(Friedman 1970). It is then the job of governments to ensure competitive markets, 
which politically may be reflected in a belief  in the need to avoid regulation of all sorts 
or to regulate to ensure competition (Clegg 2018).
However, given that in reality we are far from the situation of complete  competitive 
markets, it then becomes much more complicated as to how to meet social welfare 
aspirations. And, if  there is significant income inequality, then it is highly likely that 
the poorest people will not have any remedy through the market. Income inequality 
becomes important again in determining precisely the type of contribution to society 
that firms make. As soon as we accept that there is no complete set of competitive 
markets, and that there are significant externalities and income inequalities, we then 
move into the realm where contributions to society that do not focus on profit making 
are required to meet society’s welfare aspirations.
Therefore, the questions are: ‘what is to be done’, ‘who is to do it’, and ‘who is to 
decide?’ Here, some advocates of CSR argue that, by being virtuous, corporations will 
be rewarded through the market and, then, will ‘do well by doing good’, which is a 
twist on Andrew Carnegie’s original statement that corporations should ‘do well in 
order to do good’.
A theme in explanations of CSR is that it consists of the design of new business 
practices that respond to civil society expectations of what good corporate citizenship 
should be. Thus, CSR would remove the need to set the responsibilities of corporations 
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in legal terms. If  this were to be an effective mechanism, then there would be no need 
for regulation. However, there are a number of problems. There is no standard about 
what can be defined as ‘corporate responsibility’. As a result, managers with CSR 
responsibilities are able to select what social causes to support according to their 
 preferences. CSR managers are generally poorly endowed with financial and human 
resources. In commercially straightened times (for example, during economic 
 recessions), CSR budgets may be the first to be cut. Thus we have to ask, ‘Are CSR 
managers generally listened to, and do they exert real power within organisations?’ 
It is perfectly possible for CSR to have an extensive and major effect in one 
 particular area of society: for example, contribution to education or contribution to 
health. This is the ‘weak’ mission to ‘do good’. However, this may well not be the core 
business of the corporation.
• While CSR initiatives may improve welfare in one respect, they may damage 
welfare in a different respect, the determination of the benefit to the corpor-
ation is the guiding feature. For example CO2 emissions are made worse by 
higher ethical standards in meat production, but only the ethical achievement 
is publicised. Similarly, Walmart’s environmental initiatives to reduce waste 
and improve energy efficiency in Chinese factories resulted in a reduction in 
workplace health and safety.
• Confectionery manufacturers publicise their CSR initiatives, but tenaciously 
defend their marketing of high-sugar products that are not consistent with 
promoting consumer health. It would be far better to introduce CSR in their 
core business, but no manufacturer will do it until they all do it. Therefore, 
regulation is needed (Clegg 2018).
‘Reliance on civil regulation’ or ‘oversight by society’
The lack of government regulation and legal standards means that it is only consumers 
with purchasing power who determine what is defined as CSR, and what the CSR 
priorities of corporations are. This is an outcome of income inequality, and there is 
no solution other than regulation to ensure the welfare of those who are disen-
franchised: for example, the marketing of junk food that is cheap but not consistent 
with a sustainable health agenda.
Certain organisations—trusts and family firms—may be capable of sacrificing 
profit for social good. So, alternative forms of business organisation may be more 
effective in contributing to society. A family-controlled business can be described as 
one in which a family or a founder holds at least 20 per cent of the shares or control 
over voting) (as defined by Credit Suisse).This would include Alphabet (the parent 
firm of Google), Alibaba, and many others. While there is something in this conten-
tion, the quality of being a family firm itself  does not mean that the enterprise will 
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have an enlightened social mission. For example, we could describe Facebook as a 
family firm, and so is the Murdochs’ business empire. However, where the family firm 
does have an ethos of contributing to society, it has greater power to make long-term 
investments that will not pay off  privately for many years, if  at all, or to make invest-
ments that never pay off privately, but do good for society. The family-controlled business 
is free not to pursue profit maximisation and to pursue genuinely pro-social goals if  
they so choose. The interesting issue here is that private entities, and particularly 
‘social enterprises’, choose to pursue pro-social goals through the medium of a firm 
rather than a trust or ‘foundation’. This illustrates the institutional success of ‘the 
firm’. 
The distinction between private family businesses and public corporations with 
dispersed shareholding is blurred, and becoming more blurred, because of the more 
frequent involvement of private equity with a strong profit-maximisation motive, and 
the existence of dual-class voting shares that allow founders to hold onto control if  
and when companies go public.
As was pointed out by the chief executive of a large Canadian multinational pri-
vate company:
Ownership is not strategy. (14)
It is incorrect to conflate private ownership with socially responsible behaviour. 
There are recent stories of the ‘Tech for Good’ movement, in which disillusioned 
technology workers have quit corporate life to pursue pro-social technological ven-
tures, in disgust at the likes of Google, Facebook, and Microsoft. According to Nesta 
(the global innovation foundation that backs new ideas to tackle big challenges) there 
were 1,883 organisations of this type across the EU at the end of May 2017. Most of 
these organisations focus on education and skills training or participatory democracy; 
however, they typically consist of small-focus projects, lacking private funding. Yet 
there are some social enterprises that are not so limited in their impact: for example, 
Café Direct, the UK-based fair trade hot drinks business, now a major brand, offers 
consumers a genuine choice and puts pressure on other companies to improve their 
practices (Clegg 2018). An example comes from a US executive’s interview:
Besides, there are plenty of good reasons for companies to act on their own: (i) business 
case for CSR—it enhances competiveness and company reputation; (ii) Wall Street 
investors pay attention; (iii) customers demand it; and (iv) employees—today’s young 
talent pool—are inspired, increasing employee retention and loyalty. (6)
CSR reflects actions in which companies consider the interests of all their 
 stakeholders, including shareholders. The incorporation of stakeholders within CSR 
naturally align it to stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984). Definitions of CSR have 
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 varied, reflecting the broad nature in which it has been understood (Göbbels 2002). 
Despite apparent confusion and diversity in these definitions (see Dahlsrud 2008), the 
European Commission (EC) has produced a widely accepted definition:
CSR is a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary 
basis (European Commission 2002: 5). 
A similar definition is provided by Aguinis (2011: 855): ‘context specific organisational 
actions and policies that take into account stakeholder’s expectation’s and the triple 
bottom line of economic, social, and environmental performance.’ This is summarised 
by Kolk as ‘the triple bottom line of People, Planet, Profit’ (Kolk 2010a, in Pisani 
et al. 2017: 591). The gist of these definitions is similar.
There seems to be consensus in the management literature that, in the long term, 
the instrumental conception of corporate responsibility (Waddock & Graves 1997) is 
compatible with increasing shareholder value (Barner 2007, Grayson & Hodges 2004). 
Even if  some sacrifice of profits is necessary to fund CSR expenditure, this pays back 
in terms of improvements in corporate image and social acceptance (Donaldson & 
Preston 1995, Jones 1995, McWilliams & Siegel 2001, Wright & Ferris 1997). In the 
short term, however, there may be trade-offs between profit and other stakeholder 
objectives (Friedman 1970). Empirical results here are inconclusive (Griffin & Mahon 
1997, McWilliams & Seigel 2001). A meta-analysis showed a slightly positive relation-
ship (Orlitzky et al. 2003). Margolis and Walsh (2003: 277) found after a review of 127 
empirical studies (1972–2002) that: ‘the findings suggest there is a positive association 
between a company’s social performance and its financial performance.’ Kitzmueller 
and Shimshak (2012) find that CSR ‘mechanisms’ have limited relationships to 
induced innovation, moral hazard, shareholder preferences, or labour markets, but 
some effects on consumer markets, private politics, and pubic politics. Interestingly, 
irresponsible corporate behaviour has been found to lead to negative corporate finan-
cial performance (Engelen & Van Essen 2011). Potentially conflicting stakeholder 
goals remain an area of current research. The perceptions and values of managers are 
relevant and are also subject to current investigations (building on Henderson (2001) 
and Agle et al. (1999)). However, Husted (2005: 176) finds that firms have difficulty in 
justifying CSR investments on economic grounds—‘A careful analysis of the costs 
and benefits of CSR projects in terms of cash flows, using traditional techniques of 
valuation, often leads to the decision to forge such investments.’ Husted therefore used 
real-option analysis for the CSR decision process. Real-option models predict that 
companies will defer the (CSR) investment decision until more information is  available 
or ‘until after the nature of an uncertain environment has revealed itself ’ (Husted 
2005: 177). This analysis is developed by Cassimon et al. (2014). As long as companies 
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have some leeway in postponing the (CSR) investment decision in the absence of 
opportunity costs of waiting, they will delay investment. The optimal timing of invest-
ments in CSR is investigated by Cassimon et al. (2014). This analysis has important 
policy implications, which are developed below. 
Shared values
The business concept of creating shared values (CSV) was launched by Porter and 
Kramer (2011). The concept is designed to show the mutual independency of the 
competitiveness of a corporation and the well-being of the society in which it is 
embedded. The concept has ramifications for product redesign (for instance, to cater to 
the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ in income terms (Prahalad & Hart 2002)), improving the 
value chain in terms of inclusivity and pro-development activities and improving poor 
areas by encouraging local clusters of development, improving  suppliers, infra-
structure, education, and institutions. This builds a social value proposition into 
 corporate decision-making. It is claimed that this goes beyond the ‘add-on’ nature of 
CSR by building social values directly into the operations of the corpor ation. 
Examples of implementation include: General Electric’s ‘Ecomagination’  programme; 
Dow Agro Sciences Omega-9 oils, eliminating transfats; and Nestlé’s Moga Milk 
District in India and other ‘milk districts’ using the supply chain to  generate local 
social benefits and stimulate development. 
Nestlé
The creating shared values (CSV) agenda of Nestlé ties in closely with the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) where Nestlé’s activities are mapped 
onto the SDGs. The strategy includes ‘compliance’—conforming with law, business 
principles, and codes of conduct—‘sustainability’—‘protect the future’ and ‘sreating 
shared values’ (nutrition, water, and rural development as the focus areas). Performance 
is monitored against leading indices (Nestlé website). 
Australian Shared Values Project
Shared value is defined as policy and practices that enhance the competitiveness of 
companies while improving social and environmental conditions in the regions where 
they operate. It is a business strategy focused on companies creating measurable eco-
nomic benefit by identifying and addressing social problems that intersect with their 
business (Sharedvalue.org.au).
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Positive social change
Stephan et al. (2016: 1252) define ‘Positive Social Change as the process of transform-
ing patterns of thought, behaviour, social relationships, institutions and social struc-
ture to generate beneficial outcomes for individuals, communities, organisations, 
society and/or the environment beyond the benefits for the instigators of such 
transformations.’
These are positively initiated through the activities of market-based organisations 
(termed autonomous actions and benefits in this paper). Stephan et al. (2016) distin-
guish change mechanisms, organisational practices, and positive social change (PSC) 
strategies, the latter combining the first two as a set of purposive decisions. For our 
purposes, private incentives in corporations may be considered as a change mechanism, 
corporate culture as an organisational practice, and PSC change as an autonomous 
strategy.
Stephan et al. (2016) differentiate between ‘deep’ and ‘surface’ level PSC strategies. 
They differ in the nature and speed of transformation experienced by targets and the 
quality, timing, and reach of the resulting social impact. Deep-level PSC strategies are 
tightly coupled with organisational practices; surface-level strategies are loosely 
integrated. 
Usunier et al. (2011: 280) suggest three main sources of cross-national differences 
in the perception of the degree of compatibility between corporate economic and 
social responsibility goals: 
1. Differences in the institutional environment influencing the ‘rules of the game’ 
and therefore the nature of principal/agent relationships.
2. Differences in accepted values (Schein 1986) that influence managerial 
decision- making (Hofstede 2001).
3. Management education, shaping the world views of future mangers by 
 diffusing particular management ideologies (Ghoshal 2005): for example, ‘if  
the dominant view is that social responsibility should be considered only as an 
instrumental goal while economic responsibility is really the terminal goal, the 
perception of compatibility is encouraged’ (Usunier et al. 2011: 280).
There is evidence that corporations are cognisant of, and keen to publicise, their 
 following of higher order or community goals. For instance Nestlé in their Stakeholder 
Community Survey 2017 say:
Stakeholder perception of the alignment of our societal commitments in five areas 
with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals is promising, however and comes as a 
reassurance that we are going in the right direction’ (Nestlé 2017: 1, foreword by 
Olivier Mercer, Public Affairs Manager).
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Social responsibility of corporations—for and against
Arguments against corporations assuming social responsibility
1. It is inconsistent with long-term survival and profit maximisation:
Beyond adherence to the law, refraining from taking advantage of gaps in the law and 
abuses of failure to enforce the law, including attempts to influence the law to their 
benefits, and being accountable for their own externalities, firms have societal responsi-
bility. Within this domain, they should confine their engagement to activities that 
generate proprietary benefits and improve long-term competitive advantage. These 
activities include the creation of public goods that generate proprietary value in excess 
of public value, and social activities for which stakeholders are willing to pay a 
 premium (Nachum 2017: 2).
2. Non-corporations (NGOs (non-governmental organisations), public bodies, 
governments) are better at achieving social goals than are corporations. This 
includes products and services whose externalities cannot become proprietary 
to corporations, such as environmental goals, services for which markets do 
not exist or are dysfunctional and high-risk investments whose returns are 
uncertain: for example, specialist drugs.
3. Corporations are at a competitive disadvantage compared to public bodies 
and NGOs in meeting social goals.
4. Corporations seeking social goals harms firms and society.There is no 
 democratic control over corporations, no formal institutions to oversee the 
social causes they seek, so they have no legitimacy in these areas. The profit 
motive distorts corporations’ attempts to seek social benefits.
5. Investment by firms following the profit motive results in a more efficient 
 utilisation of resources and generates social value (Friedman 1970). 
Arguments for corporations seeking social goals
1. The argument that maximising profit also maximises social welfare only works 
when market prices provide accurate signals of social costs and benefits:
• Ignores negative externalities.
• Ignores information asymmetries.
• Assumes governments can provide public goods efficiently.
2. Market power and inequalities in incomes require government intervention 
(market failure).
3. Powerful corporations can distort or negate legislation/regulation, so correcting 
market failure is difficult (lobbying).
4. Control failures within the firm itself  can result in societal disbenefits (Sachs 
et al. 2017).
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Governance
The essential issue of modern corporate governance, balancing authority and responsi-
bility, is answered by Arrow (1974) in terms of convergent answered expectations 
(Keasey et al. 1995: 4):
Ultimately, it seems to me, authority is viable to the extent that it is the focus of 
 convergent expectations. An individual obeys authority because he expects others to 
obey it … the functional role of authority, its value in making the system work, plays 
a part, though only a part, in securing obedience. This functional role will only be 
influential if  in fact the authority is visible and is believed to be respected by others 
(Arrow 1974: 72–3).
The principal-agent approach to corporate governance takes a much narrower 
view of governance (Jensen & Meckling 1976). A terse definition is given by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997: 737): ‘Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers 
of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.’ 
This contrasts with the much wider ‘stakeholder’ view of corporate governance.
Hirshman’s (1970) ‘Exit, voice, and loyalty’ framework is much broader. Exit relies 
on the ability of owners to exert pressure on managers by the threat or actual sale of 
their shares to other owners. Activist shareholders can thus pressurise managers to 
behave responsibly (or otherwise). The voice-based strategy occurs when owners are 
committed to the corporation over a long period of time because they are actively 
involved in the monitoring and disciplining of managers. Loyalty to the corporation 
by owners has to be earned. 
Governance and the role of boards of directors
Boards of directors have a crucial role to play in the governance of the corporation. 
The composition of the board (Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990), the balance between 
insider and outsider directors (Rediker & Seth 1995), and the (social) functioning of 
the board (Pettigrew & McNulty 1995) have been shown to be factors in governance 
and strategy (Baysinger et al. 1991). The role of the board and governance issues 
 feature prominently in the executives’ commentaries on societal goals. 
Corporate governance is everything and this comes from the board. (1)
Board oversight and proactive CEO engagement are essential. With proper leadership, 
resources, and employee buy-in, a favourable organisational culture and climate can be 
created. (6)
Critical need for the boards of directors and CEOs to drive the CSR initiatives from the 
top down. (7)
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The CEO’s value system and or the competitive context plays a major role in deciding on 
the scope of the goal: shareholder only or multiple stakeholders. Usually it has been an 
external force (competition, activist groups, NGOs, customers, consumers, a very young 
and idealistic workforce, etc.) that has forced an organisation to adopt societal goals. 
A CEO’s value system has driven societal goals and they have been used as a differentiator 
in a market entry strategy into a competitive market, and sometimes it has been used 
successfully by an incumbent as a form of competitive advantage pre-emptively. (10)
The CEO’s value system which drives the value system of his management team. Clear 
and specific societal goals and incentives for the organisation to drive toward those 
 societal goals. Clear management routines that incorporate progress toward societal 
goals. Strong economic arguments that derive from driving societal goals: making money 
is compatible with driving societal goals. Have to look beyond the obvious to make a 
strong business case. Small experiments to showcase wins. Start small and then scale. 
Understand that employees feel good by doing good and when employees feel good they 
are extremely productive.’ (10)
Governance through argumentation
Corporations exist within civil society and civil society exercises a role in the  governance 
of corporations. Indeed, civil society exercises ‘governance through argumentation’ 
(an additional element of governance in addition to governance through the market 
and governance through state coordination). This governance mechanism operates 
not only through NGOs but also through social movements, such as the cooperative 
movement, the mutuality movement (Kay 1994), and pressures from religious and 
other morally based organisations (the Quakers are a long-standing example). 
Lobbying organisations and social pressure groups are increasing ‘augmentation’ 
pressures on corporations on a global basis. 
Ownership and control
The dispersal of ownership of the corporation can give governance problems if  too 
much managerial control is allowed (Berle & Means 1968). Alternatively, the concen-
tration of ownership in a few hands (for example, institutional investors) can lead to 
excessive owner-control (Short & Keasey 1977).
The capital structure of corporations—financing by debt or equity—gives rise to 
conflicts not only between equity holders and managers but also between debt and 
equity owners (Grossman & Hart 1982). Indeed, Williamson (1988) sees debt and 
equity as alternative governance structures—debt as a constraint; equity giving 
 discretion to managers.
The market for corporate control constrains managers by the threat or actuality of 
takeover. This is largely construed as an incentive to performance, but it could also act 
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as a censure for wrongdoing. The efficacy of the market for corporate control varies 
widely across jurisdictions (Franks & Meyer 1990). Bhide (1993) shows that high 
 levels of stock market liquidity (to encourage exit) conflict with active corporate 
 governance by shareholders (an echo of the exit–voice analysis).
The market for corporate control is, of course, subject to imperfections, notably 
the existence of large shareholders, including pension funds and ‘blockholders’ such 
as family holdings. The rise of ‘activist shareholders’, who aim to achieve not-for-
profit goals is a force for a wider spread of outcomes. In addition, the existence of 
‘crowdfunding’, through organisations such as Kickstarter, Crowdcube, and Seedrs, 
promises new avenues for web-based groups to utilise the capital market to achieve 
their objectives through start-ups or acquisitions of corporations.
There remains a crucial distinction between ‘activity’ and ‘outcomes’ (Rawhouser 
et al. 2017). There is a difference between what a corporation does and what it say that 
it does. It is an intriguing question as to whether this is picked up by the firm’s capital- 
market valuation. Arguments are emerging that firms can sustain a capital-market 
downgrading in value if  they are seen to be sustainable in the long run. 
Stakeholders
Stakeholders are, ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achieve-
ment of the organisation’s objectives’ (Freeman 1984: 46). It is useful (and customary) 
to distinguish between internal stakeholders and external stakeholders.
• Internal stakeholders are individuals or groups who work for or own the  business. 
They include all employees, the board of directors, and stockholders.
• External stakeholders are all other individuals and groups that have some 
claim on the firm. Typically, this group comprises customers, suppliers,  lenders, 
governments, unions, local communities, and the general public.
Depending on the interests of the main stakeholders, and the core activities of the 
company, different objectives will assume different degrees of relative importance. 
This implies that managers of corporations must question what their responsibility to 
such stakeholders is, and that the profit motive must be balanced against other aims 
and objectives. The challenge for corporations and their managers is to reconcile the 
different mandates that their stakeholders demand of them, and to deal, as best as 
possible, with the tensions that exist between them. There is no perfect solution:
I believe contributions should come down to individuals making independent decisions 
with a supportive company culture of giving back to their communities. (8) 
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Reputation
‘Firms which build a reputation for ethical collaborations over a long period are able 
to substitute cooperative outcomes for unsatisfactory cheating ones’ (Keasey et al. 
1997: 9). This ‘contractual architecture’ (Kay 1994) may be a source of competitive 
advantage. Firms with such a reputation will attract new trading partners (Buckley & 
Casson 1988, Kreps 1996). Adjustments to the internal and external contractual 
architecture of corporations can be of critical significance to social welfare. 
What is a company’s reputation worth?
For Unilever, a recent report valued the company’s reputation in 2018 at £65,094 
 million; in 2017 Apple’s reputation was estimated to be $317,890 million, while in 
2017 the reputation of Ambev, the Brazilian brewing company, was valued at $47,888 
million.
It has been hypothesised that a good reputation provides benefits, including lower 
costs, the ability to command premium prices, and higher status, and contributes to a 
more positive financial performance. A favourable reputation can also affect the 
 willingness of buyers and suppliers to transact with a particular company.
Obligations of the corporation
Why should a business firm, which represents private property, have greater obliga-
tions to the local community than an ordinary citizen? (McMahon 1986: 181). One 
answer here is a ‘social contract’ explanation. Companies are given privileges by pub-
lic authorities, such as limited liability, and it is arguable that these are given for a 
public purpose; therefore corporations owe a social (as well as private) duty. 
The ‘rights’ approach and the ‘power’ approach (McMahon 1986) suggest a social 
contract model (Palmer 2001), leading to ‘contractarianism’ in which businesses need 
to earn a ‘Social License to operate’ (Demuijnck & Fasterling 2016). The power of 
corporations requires a responsibility model under which: (a) The greater the social 
power of the firm, the greater the firm’s social responsibility. (b) Whoever does not use 
his or her social power responsibly will lose it. This can be broadened to a ‘systems 
model’, such as that of Galbraith (1972).
Governance outliers?
(This section assumes that ‘normal governance’ does not include social purposes.)
1. Social enterprises, explicitly ethical companies (Kerlin 2012):  
Social enterprises (Mair & Marti 2006) are organisations that:
• are led by an economic, social, cultural, or environmental mission 
 consistent with a public or community benefit;
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• trade to fulfil their mission;
• derive a substantial proportion of their income from trade; and
• reinvest the majority of their profit/surplus in the fulfilment of their 
mission.
(Barraket et al. 2016: 1)
Social enterprise is a business founded for a social purpose, rather than to 
maximise profit. These can be not-for-profit or for-profit. An example of a 
social enterprise that is for-profit is auticon, founded to support autistic people 
into, and within, the workplace. Social enterprise may well be an important 
trend for the future. (For a review of research on social entrepreneurship, see 
Saebi et al. (forthcoming).)
See Figure 3.
Figure 3. Social enterprises. (source: author).
1. Mission—includes social objectives
2. Strategic decisions reflect mission ‘social entrepreneurship’
                                Economic goals Social goals
3. Sustainability 
    Re-invest in business Invest in social goals
4. Outcome
Trade-off between sustaining business and achievement of social goals.
Examples include: Fourphone, Kwyishi, and MUD Jeans.
2. Companies founded with a social mission: examples include: Unilever and 
Cadbury. It should be noted that corporate missions change over time and this 
is well illustrated by the business history of these companies. 
3. Companies founded on principle: for example: ‘Fairtrade’.  
Corporations are not uniform. Governance solutions are, and have been, 
sought through non-contractual governance (Mccauley 1996), reciprocity 
344 Peter J. Buckley
(Boddewyn & Buckley 2017), relational contracting (Fiske 1992), and myriad 
forms of cooperative agreements (Mariti & Smiley 1983). Governance in the 
round, even just considering the corporate level, is not uniform or ‘one-size 
fits-all’.
III REGULATION AND CONSTRAINTS ON THE CORPORATION
Ideally, tax systems should attempt to raise revenue in the least damaging way. 
Regulations should seek to deliver certain specified objectives, again with minimal 
damage and downside risk. Tax and regulations, therefore, are not optimal as tools of 
industrial policy. 
Constraints on corporate behaviour cover far more than regulation. Issues of 
compliance versus social purpose go beyond simple regulation. Among the constraints 
on company behaviour are codes of conduct; ‘standards’; and pressure from social 
movements, NGOs, employee involvement chains, and lobbying organisations. 
Regulation can be burdensome and even counterproductive. Compliance can be 
so demanding that corporations do not have time to achieve other objectives. It can 
also create so much compliance ‘paperwork’ that the primary task of the organisation 
is lost. Simple and effective regulation is needed, but is often not achievable. A sharp 
distinction between ‘compliance’ and ‘non-compliance’ leaves little room for discre-
tion, and this study shows that discretion by corporations is necessary for them to 
achieve societal goals. 
‘Regulatory capture’ is a major problem, and corporations often have the resources 
and skills to subvert the purposes of regulation. The appropriation of regulatory 
 perogatives is not unknown. 
Furthermore, Goodhart’s law may operate—where a measure of (societal) 
 performance becomes a target, then it ceases to be a good measure.
Regulation is absolutely necessary. (1)
Visionary governments can invest in breakthrough technology to enhance societal goals 
that can provide incentives for private industry to invest and/or engage in public–private 
partnerships without actually regulating any industry or a specific societal goal and 
thereby disrupt the market conditions. Regulation will be possible only in accordance 
with the political ideology of voters. (2)
Doubtful that government bureaucracy can play an efficient and effective role in mandating 
and monitoring social responsibility/sustainability actions of private sector. However, a 
more appropriate role for the governments is to establish standards and mandate for 
public disclosure of such activities. This would go a long way towards enhancing transparency 
around companies’ impact on society. (6)
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Regulation brings in lawyers, auditors, etc., results in minimal compliance. (13)
It is better for companies to own being part of the community rather than minimal 
[compliance] effort. (13) 
Private regulation
It can be argued that FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) has 
successfully developed its own private legal system to regulate the international 
 football (soccer) industry (Gomtsyan et al. 2018, Hock & Gomtsyan 2018). The 
researchers quoted suggest that this leaves the organisation free of accountability to 
governments or to civil society. FIFA’s rules have a largely unprecedented degree of 
sophistication and independence from state authority that nevertheless bind football 
clubs, players, and national teams to FIFA’s rules. Disputes are usually solved not in 
normal courts of justice but in special sports arbitration tribunals and backed by spe-
cial FIFA sanctions (for example, bans from paying football). This provides common 
rules across the sport and promotes predictable contractual relations and equal 
 conditions for competition and swift resolution of conflict. However, this creates vul-
nerabilities—lack of transparency and the potential for power appropriation and 
bureaucratic control. The authors argue that FIFA’s private legal system is the result 
of an implicit contract with states and supranational organisations giving away part of 
their monopoly powers of regulation. This is tolerated as long as it promotes the 
 interests of broad stakeholder groups—clubs, players, and spectators. The special  status 
is weakened when special-interest groups are privileged. This provokes regulations to 
investigate governance issues within FIFA and to threaten taking regulatory control. 
This would remove abuse but lose the benefits of tailored rules and innovation. 
Compliance versus social purpose
Figure 4 illustrates the practices of compliance and social purpose.
National regulation
China, Denmark, Malaysia, and South Africa are among the countries that require 
the reporting of sustainability and social responsibility. Ioannou and Serafeim (2015) 
say ‘Current efforts to increase transparency around organisations’ impact on society 
are effective at improving disclosure quantity and quality as well as corporate value.’
It is also notable that ‘user-friendly’ regulation can stimulate voluntary compliance. 
A good example here is the impact of advance transfer pricing agreements on voluntary 
compliance (Cipek 2018).
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Indian law requires companies to give 2 per cent of profits to charity. India is the 
first country in the world to enshrine corporate giving into law. It is arguable that 
other countries do this less explicitly (for example, France; and allocation to housing 
and health care provision in several countries). Following a change in company law in 
April 2014, businesses with annual revenues of more than 10 billion rupees 
(£105 million) must give away 2 per cent of their net profit to charity. Areas in which 
they can invest this money include education, poverty, gender equality, and hunger 
(https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/apr/05/india-csr-law-requires- 
companies-profits-to-charity-is-it-working).
OECD Guidelines
The OECD Guidelines are recommendations jointly addressed by governments to 
multinational enterprises. Forty-two countries adhere to the guidelines: thirty-four 
OECD members and eight non-members The common aim of the governments 
adhering to the guidelines is to encourage the positive contributions that multinational 
Figure 4. Compliance and social purpose (source: Weller 2017: 20; adapted from Schwartz & Carroll 
2008).  
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enterprises can make to economic, environmental, and social progress and to minimise 
the difficulties to which their various operations may give rise. The guidelines provide 
principles and standards of good practice consistent with applicable laws and inter-
nationally recognised standards. Observance of the guidelines by MNEs is voluntary 
and is not legally enforceable.
The content of the guidelines is extensive, covering a range of diverse areas such as:
1. human rights,
2. disclosure of information,
3. labour and industrial relations,
4. the environment,
5. anti-bribery,
6. consumer protection,
7. science and technology.
The mostly commonly referred to chapter of the guidelines relates to human rights, 
while the sector that references the guidelines the most is financial services. A key 
emphasis of the 2011 guidelines, and an area in which they are perceived to have had 
real impact, is on the MNE’s due diligence and responsible supply-chain 
management.
Codes of conduct
The UN has made concerted attempts to introduce societal goals into economic 
 policies and actions. Its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) followed by its 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) represent frameworks intended to guide 
 policy and the actions of firms, and indeed of civic society and outcomes. In September 
2015, the UN adopted the SDGs, a set of seventeen goals to end poverty, protect the 
planet, and ensure prosperity for all, as part of a new global sustainable development 
agenda. Each of the goals has specific targets to be achieved over the next fifteen years 
(‘The 2030 Agenda’).
A 2017 KPMG survey showed that the SDGs have resonated strongly with 
 businesses worldwide in less than two years since their launch. Around four in ten 
corporate responsibility reports from the top hundred companies by revenue in each 
of the forty-nine countries researched in the study, and the world’s 250 largest com-
panies by revenue based on the Fortune 500 ranking of 2016 made a connection 
between the company’s corporate responsibility activities and the SDGs. (See Table 3 
for the UN Global Compact.)
The moral framework set by the UN is not the only international mechanism 
 promoting corporate social responsibility. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
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Enterprises contain a grievance and promotion mechanism—the National Contact 
Points (NCPs) for Responsible Business. These are not legally binding and can be 
characterised (e.g., Nieuwenkamp 2018: 1) as ‘international soft law’. NCPs are man-
dated to promote corporate responsibility and to impartially problem-solve. They 
incorporate ILO (International Labour Organization) labour standards and the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and—in 2011—were revised to 
include global value chains. The grievance mechanism has an impact on all global 
value chains with a link to any of the forty-eight adherent governments (Nieuwenkamp 
2018). Case law by the NCP covers hundreds of business operations, including ending 
forced and child labour, improving health and safety, improving human rights through 
due diligence, and actions to secure compensation for indigenous peoples. From this 
review of NCPs, Nieuwenkamp (2018: 2) concludes: ‘Responsible business conduct is 
no longer voluntary in the sense of being optional, even though it is still not legally 
binding. There is an increased uptake of corporate responsibility and due diligence 
standards in legal instruments.’
Consequences do follow from non-observance of the guidelines and national 
 governments do have tools to incentivise companies to behave responsibly. Export 
credit agencies can withdraw support for irresponsible ventures. Institutional investors 
can use their agency to promote better behaviour and activist stakeholders can access 
the decisions.
Table 3. The ten principles of the UN global compact.
Human rights Labour Environment Anti-corruption
1 Businesses should 3 Businesses should 7 Businesses should 10 Businesses should
support and respect uphold the freedom support a precautionary work against
the protection of of association and the approach to corruption in all its
internationally effective recognition environmental forms, including
proclaimed of the right to challenges;  extortion and bribery.
human rights; and collective bargaining;
2 Make sure that 4 The elimination of 8 Undertake initiatives
they are not all forms of forced and to promote greater
complicit in human compulsory labour environmental
rights abuses.  responsibility; and 
 5 The effective 9 Encourage the
 abolition of child  development of
 labour; and environmentally
  friendly technologies. 
 6 The elimination of 
 discrimination in 
 respect of employment 
 and occupation.  
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It can be argued that such multilateral frameworks have little effect on policy or 
outcomes. However, there is substantial and increasing evidence that MNEs do take 
account of such moral frameworks and are increasingly constrained to do so by their 
stakeholders. One example is Nestlé who in the Foreword to their Stakeholder 
Community Survey 2017 said: ‘Stakeholder perception of the development of our 
societal commitments in five areas with the UN’s Sustainable Development Gods is 
promising, however, and comes as a reassurance that we are going in the right  direction’ 
(Nestlé 2017: 1).
The increase in shareholder activism, stakeholder pressure, the importance of 
 conforming to (global) standards, the increase in ethical consumerism, and public and 
social pressure in general require MNEs, in particular, to pay increasing attention to 
moral standards in business behaviour, not just in ‘corporate social responsibility’ or 
‘shared value’ but as a means of long-term sustainability and survival. 
The moral framework of policy at both international and national levels provides 
a set of constraints and incentives to corporate behaviour that cannot be ignored. The 
complex web of hard, legally binding, and ‘soft’ law overarches international business 
conduct. And it transcends the ‘governance triangle’. These ‘moral’ effects on inward 
and outward FDI (foreign direct investment) are concrete and operate through 
 markets, governments, and civil society. 
There is a great deal of overlap (for example, on ‘sustainability’) between ‘private’ 
guidelines, such as the Guidelines of the International Chamber of Commerce, and 
voluntary intergovernmental codes such as the ILO MNE Declaration, the UN 
Guiding Principles and the OECD MNE guidelines (Sauvant & Mann 2018), suggest-
ing strong convergence. Similar codes on a regional basis are also extant—such as the 
Pan African Investment Code (2015). The focus of recent codes is to bring investment 
rule-making into the multilateral trading system and to facilitate (increasing) 
 investment rather than just protecting investment and reducing risk (Mbengue 2018). 
Standards
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) established in 1946 in Geneva with a membership of 161 national 
standards bodies (ISO.org). ISO develops and publishes international standards that 
underpin technology and ensure quality. Standards have become strategic tools for 
companies that reduce costs, minimise waste and errors, and improve productivity. 
International standards provide a level playing field across international markets, 
reduce transaction costs, and facilitate trade.
Key standards for international business include the ranges ISO 9000, ISO 14000, 
and OHSAS 1000 (these are best thought of as ‘families’ of standards). The current 
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standard ISO 9001 is a quality management system across all areas of business,  including 
continual improvement tools. Certification is close to a requirement for meeting 
 regulatory requirements internationally. ISO 14001 is an environmental management 
standard that demonstrates commitment to controlling the external environmental 
commitment of activities. The standard OHSAS 18001 Health and Safety Management 
System is an internationally recognised standard that provides a systematic approach 
to managing health and safety risks and seeking opportunities to manage high-risk 
activities. All these standards relate to management processes and, as such, have 
 significant impacts on management objectives, style, and structures, including systems 
auditing.
Compliance with standards is technically voluntary. However, it is virtually 
 impossible to conduct international business without certification. Compliance with 
standards therefore combines ‘regulated behaviour’ with ‘autonomous social 
 contributions’ to the extent that standards incorporate social well-being. 
One example of the use of private standards to restore credibility to a commodity- 
based industry is the case of palm oil (Nesadurai 2017). The problems of tropical 
deforestation, biodiversity loss, greenhouse gas emissions, disturbance of carbon-rich 
peatland, exploitation of workers, and ‘land grabs’ have been evident in palm oil 
extraction. The principal producing countries (Malaysia and Indonesia) have historic-
ally been reluctant to regulate production, despite pressure from NGOs. In 2004 a 
multi-stakeholder Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil was established and in 2007 
a comprehensive certification scheme with defined environmental and social standards 
provoked limited reforms.
Voluntary governance schemes rely on the market in using downstream corporate 
buyer’s demand for sustainably produced products to incentivise upstream producers 
to act responsibly. ‘Whether production practices change depends on the strength of 
these market incentives and signals, their unimpeded transmission along the supply 
chain as well as the capacity of private standards to reinforce and comply those incen-
tives and signals’ (Nesadurai 2017: 1). Difficulties in monitoring, auditing, and 
enforcement and fragmented supply chains reduce the incentives for growers to adopt 
certification. Selling to ‘non-green’ markets (such as India and China) reduces the 
pressure on growers.
The Palm Oil Innovation Group (2013) backed stronger standards proscribing 
deforestation, the use of peat soil, and social exploitation to provide benchmark 
 standards (No Deforestation, Peat, Exploitation—NDPE). The agribusiness firm 
 predominant in palm oil production—Wilmar—pledged ‘No Deforestation’ in 
December 2013, leading other producers to source NDPE palm oil and this now covers 
approximately 60 per cent of production (Nesadurai 2017: 2). The crucial change is 
‘supply-chain traceability’ as a key industry norm requiring detailed verification of 
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the source of palm oil to the grower. Demand pressure reaches growers through 
 surveillance of supply-chain actors, evaluation of responsible behaviour, and education 
and training. NGOs are key players in all these processes in sustainable supply chains.
Official (governmental) policies have followed these developments. Sub-national 
authorities of South Sumatra province and Seruyan regency in Indonesia and the 
State of Sabah in Malaysia have ‘implemented jurisdictional certification for all palm 
oil produced in these jurisdictions’ (Nesadurai 2017: 2). The Malaysian and Indonesian 
central governments are developing mandatory national certification schemes and, 
although these are weaker than private sustainability standards, they place sustainability 
in the centre of national discourses.
Such tripartite agreements are not a panacea, nor are they secure in results. 
Rainforests are reportedly still being destroyed by palm oil suppliers to major corpor-
ations (Webster 2018). This raises questions about the assurances of the roundtable 
that rainforests are protected. Major customers of the alleged deforester immediately 
announced investigations and suspensions of supply contracts. The supermarket 
Iceland announced that truly sustainable palm oil was not possible on a mass scale 
and committed to eliminate palm oil from its own-brand products—a possibly 
 ‘burdensome responsibility’ action. 
This case shows that private governance can lead reform but that progress can be 
slow and contested. A global standard on what constitutes sustainable palm oil and a 
common system to implement it are still needed (Rosenbarger 2018). Private gov-
ernance standards can incentivise even poor small remote farmers to adopt strong 
sustainability standards if  given technical and financial assistance. 
The introduction of ISO 26000, guidance on social responsibility, brings together 
the UN’s SDG goals and operating standards. It contains over 450 recommendations 
that have a direct impact on the SDG goals, with guidance on how corporations can 
operate in an ethical and sustainable way that contributes to sustainable development 
(ISO 2018).
Must have adherence to formal standards (ISO), certification and a quality system 
—‘Our quality journey. (3)
CSR does not have the same impact as standards because it is harder to justify its impact 
on the bottom line. (3)
We visit suppliers and make sure we are buying from suppliers who deliver quality. (3)
Employee involvement
Employees are an important stakeholder in the corporation. They can be involved via 
share ownership in order to achieve an alignment of goals between employee and 
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owners—hopefully resulting in an increase in employees’ commitment to the firm and 
increasing their voice in decision making. Employees can also be involved in boards 
of directors or other decision-making bodies in the corporation. This is a subject on 
which there is considerable recent research and it requires further development and 
investigation. (See inter alia Aguinis & Glavas (forthcoming).) 
In the labour pool millennials are very engaged. (13)
Younger people are agitators for more CSR. (13)
Demand pressures
Demand pressures on the corporation to produce ‘ethical goods’ and ‘responsible 
products’ are increasing dramatically. The reputational damage to transgressing 
 societal limits are potentially enormous. 
Certification
Voluntary certification at corporate level is provided by ‘Certified B Corporation’ 
 status. ‘B Corps are for-profit companies certified by the non-profit B Lab to meet 
rigorous standards of social and environmental performance, accountability and 
transparency’ (http://www.bcorporation.net). There are currently over 2,100 certified 
B Corps from fifty countries and over 130 industries. Performance requirements on 
‘using business as a force for good’ are required. External certification is increasingly 
gaining acceptance (The Economist 2018). 2 
Product certification
‘Businesses can signal to internal and external stakeholders that they are conforming 
to received ethical business practices by using ethical labels or ‘ecolabels’ for their 
products’ (Voss 2018: 361). These can be local: ‘Water Lily’ in Lithuania and Afrisco 
Certified Organic in South Africa; or international, such as Fairtrade or Rainforest 
Alliance. These certifications rely on trust in the effectiveness of the certification 
 system and continuous monitoring of the certification criteria. Non-governmental, 
non-profit organisations, such as the Rainforest Alliance, Cotton Made in Africa, or 
Forest Stewardship Council, provide corporations with the opportunity to enhance 
brand reputation and equity, and legitimise their operations. 
2 The Economist (2018) claims ‘some 2500 have been certified’.
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Socially responsible investment
As Yan et al. (2018: 1) say, ‘Socially responsible investing (SRI) is gaining traction in 
the financial sector, but it is unclear whether the dominant financial logic competes 
with the social logic in the founding of SRI funds.’
Sustainable investing
Sustainable investing is carried out not only as a matter of moral responsibility, but 
also to generate better returns for clients. The trade-off between these two objectives 
and the potential short-term versus long-term returns issues remain to be explored. 
Sustainable investing covers environmental, social, and governance goals. Companies 
such as Blue Harbour claim that social and environmental issues have become integral 
to their asset portfolio. Despite some preliminary evidence on higher annualised 
returns (Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim (forthcoming) and Grewdal et al. (forthcoming)), 
the jury remains out on long-term improvements in returns. 
The current position on sustainable investing was the subject of the interview with 
a senior consultant of a ‘big 4’ UK consultancy:
Some big insurance companies are leading in social investment, particularly those from 
continental Europe. People in key positions are pushing sustainability because they want 
to take a long term view.
The European Commission High Level Expert Group are driving the agenda [on 
 sustainable investment] following the Paris Climate Change Convention. This is not yet 
legislation so much as potential legislation and persuasion.
Mark Carney [Governor of the Bank of England] is pushing for more climate impact 
disclosure in the reporting for public corporations.
This is voluntary at the moment but many companies are taking it into account for 
investment, reporting, and supply chain issues.
There is a lack of data to drive the agenda forward on climate change impact. There are 
more indexes and benchmarks beginning to appear on sustainability such as the Brookings 
Institution Global Impact Bands Database.
A number of trailblazers in sustainable investment exist such as Unilever’s commitment 
to the SDGs as ‘top of the leader board’. 
Tax incentives help with sustainable investment such as the [2014] Social Investment 
Tax Relief [SITR]. Government backing for the Principles for Responsible Investment, 
as given by Teresa May is critical. Wider incentives obviously help.
The emergence and development of Special Impact Investment has been rapid. As of 
2017 there were 108 contracted Social Investment Bonds [SIBs] in 25 countries. The 
UK is the leader with 42.
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Social Investment Banks such as Big Society Capital are poised to grow and become 
significant players.
A change in culture needs champions to drive it and it has to be a person of influence such 
as the Head of Strategy or Head of Investment in order to lead cultural change. (12)
Auditing (independent auditing) is an important external pressure on compliance.
Supply chain
The section on ‘standards’ above drew attention to supplier codes of conduct and 
audit. The externalisation of societal audit also provides an opportunity for compliance 
experts to audit social responsibility and affect the policies and practice of corpor-
ations on a global basis. Corporate responsibility in corporations as spread through 
their supply chains internationally is a potentially important source of transmission 
of CSR. (See, for example, the jewelry and gold supply chains (Human Rights Watch 
2018).) The OECD has developed a ‘human-rights due diligence’ approach (OECD 
2010) for conflict areas. This is one of a series of ‘Responsible Business Conduct by 
Sector’ guidelines. 
Monitoring of the supply chain is becoming more crucial. (5)
European companies require their whole supply chain to be up to CSR issues. (13)
Configuring the value chain—‘end-to-end’ view of internalisation. Transport/Packaging/
Standards. (14)
We should note ‘government failure’ as well as market failure. A recent report on 
supply chains in apparel notes that (weak) governments require support in regulating 
international supply chains. Nachum (2018: 3) says:
to date, Bangladesh’s government has not displayed the ability or willingness to 
embrace actions. They propose several alternative constituencies that should assume 
the responsibility for instilling change, including the ILO, the global brands and their 
home governments, as well as social activists and NGOs. They also extended a call for 
consumers to endorse in their consumption behaviour ethical practices in the apparel 
supply chain, and ease pressure on the bonds. 
Thus the host government is proposing a form of ‘new transnational governance 
mechanism’ (see below) to reinforce its regulatory authority. 
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Summary
This is the era of the constrained corporation. Corporations are constrained not only 
by official government regulation, but also by codes of conduct, compliance to stand-
ards, the influence of social movements (including employee involvement), demand 
pressures (including ‘ethical’ consumers), and social auditing. The Zeitgeist is against 
unconstrained capitalism and the contribution of corporations to society has to be 
seen against this backdrop of constraints. Such thinking has led to the ‘governance 
triangle’ approach to corporate policies (Abbott & Snidal 2008): the suggestion of a 
web of processes involving cooperation between the state, civil society, and the market 
(Figure 5). 
 Governance through
 coordination
State
 Governance through Governance through
 argumentation competition
 Civil society Market
Figure 5. The governance triangle (source: adapted from Abbott & Snidal 2008).
Measurement issues of social impact of business
Constructs such as socially responsible investment, corporate social responsibility, 
and social entrepreneurship are widely and inconsistently used (Rawhouser et al. 
2017: 21). There is a strong case for the careful conceptualisation and definition of 
these key concepts. 
IV ORGANISING SOCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY INCENTIVES
One answer to ‘making managers do good’ is to manipulate their incentive structure. 
Reputation effects are effective in small social groups (elite managers) or where trans-
parency makes individual action clear. Thus, enlightened self-interest leads managers 
to social goals. It is likely that the cost of such an incentive structure—its design, 
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monitoring, and delivery—will be high. The information content of such a system is 
likely to be great (Casson 1991, Klein & Leffler 1981). A reputation for trustworthy 
behaviour is an important asset and this helps to sustain trustworthy behaviour.
The role of leadership in an incentive-based system is to institute and support 
formal monitoring and to ensure the transparency and integrity of the reward system. 
The monitoring of contracts is a specialised and complex activity. 
• Can companies ensure that their reward system is consistent with their 
values?
• Monetary rewards may reduce pro-social motivation (by ‘cheapening’ it).
• Why should incentives reduce pro-social motivation when it does not do so for 
‘normal’ activities? 
Incentives are potentially important, but the interviewees suggested that they need 
careful consideration and management. 
Incentives can be temporary. (1)
Designing incentives to ‘do good’ leads to complications—how are trade-offs managed? 
(2)
How do you trade-off ‘social benefit’ against increasing sales? (2)
Incentives can be given if the targets are clear enough. (5)
If a corporation is committed to contributing to societal goals, they will find ways to 
motivate and inspire their employees, suppliers, and customers to adapt to these values. 
The idea of monetary incentives could work, but monetary incentives in and of them-
selves are somewhat of a blunt motivational instrument. It would be much better to  create 
a culture that promotes social contributions, and hires employees who share that culture 
and want to do something to enhance it. (9)
Incentives generate unintended consequences. (13)
Here, the salience of the issue may be important.
From the firm’s point of view a ‘cost–benefit’ analysis of the resource utilisation 
may bring clarity. (An example is Apple being asked to break into an iPhone for secur-
ity reasons. This will have a negative effect on all Apple customers if  the company can 
access all personal data stored on their devices.) 
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V ORGANISING SOCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS VIA 
CORPORATE CULTURE
As Casson (1991: 3) points out, ‘An effective culture has a strong moral content.’ 
Trust, in an organisation or an economy, has transactions-cost-reducing effects 
(Buckley & Casson 1988). A formal culture can overcome problems that procedures 
(including incentives) based on monitoring or compliance with contracts cannot. 
‘A strong culture therefore reduces transactions costs and enhances performance’ 
(Casson 1991: 3). This, however, does not mean that the only reason for moral content 
in  corporate culture is purely instrumental.
Trust is a valuable asset in any organisation, as it improves spontaneous coordination 
and avoids recourse to law or regulation. Even the most secure contract cannot always 
ensure that the victim of a dispute will be able to enforce a penalty against an offender 
(Loomes & Sugden 1986). Legal costs may be prohibitive and evidence hard to collect. 
Goodwill is an effective substitute for legalism (Dore 1983).
Can managers be trusted to ‘do the right thing’ in the absence of well-specified 
contracts and targetted incentives? (The section below considers the manipulation of 
incentives.) Moral commitment is an alternative to enlightened self-interest. In such a 
system, managers ‘punish themselves’ (forgo reward) rather than relying on third-
party sanctions. Mangers become ‘self  monitoring agents’ (Casson 1996: 17). 
Forbearance from cheating sustains mutual trust where it can be observed and 
 reciprocated (Buckley & Casson 1988).
The question of the mechanisms by which a strong moral culture can be created in 
a corporation and the role of leadership are crucial. The leadership role here is of a 
‘moralist and exemplar who engineers commitment in order to build up trust between 
the followers’ (Casson 1991: 18). Potentially, the engineering of commitment by a 
leader or leadership group will enjoy the active consent of the followers (Lauterbach 
1954). This often represents replacing private wants with collective ones; selfish 
 concerns with altruistic ones. Changing preferences is not an easy task. Followers 
(managers and workers) may be attracted by a leadership style of which they approve. 
Thus, behaviour becomes self-reinforcing at the organisational level. The ‘social license 
to operate’ (Demuijnck & Fasterling 2016) becomes generalised throughout the corpor-
ation. A reputation for moral commitment is a valuable asset and cheating is  punished, 
at individual and corporate level, by loss of reputation (Axelrod 1984, Kreps & Wilson 
1982). Leadership—moral leadership—therefore involves changing the preference 
structure of managers to incorporate or to emphasise social good in their decision 
making. The task of top managers and owners is to effect this preference change. 
Corporate culture ‘gives hierarchical inferiors an idea ex ante how the organisation 
will react to circumstances as they arise: in a strong sense it gives identity to the 
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 organisation. More than this, corporate culture communicates an organisation’s 
 identity to hierarchical superiors’ (Kreps 1996: 256). Corporate culture thus substi-
tutes for an infeasible centralisation of decision making, the costs of which would be 
prohibitive. ‘Corporate culture also provides a means of measuring the performance 
of hierarchical superiors’ (Kreps 1996: 257). 
There is no single ‘corporate culture’ in any business firm—as interviewee (1) says, 
it is patchy and variable both by time and place: 
Culture exists in pockets throughout the company—there is no overall, all-pervasive 
 corporate culture. (1)
Company culture comes from the original founder but is affected by market realities. 
Company cultures have to compete and to adapt. Cultures are exposed to competition, 
just like anything else. (5)
If a corporation is committed to contributing to societal goals, they will find ways to 
motivate and inspire their employees, suppliers, and customers to adapt to these values. 
The idea of monetary incentives could work, but monetary incentives in and of them-
selves are somewhat of a blunt motivational instrument. It would be much better to  create 
a culture that promotes social contributions, and hires employees who share that culture 
and want to do something to enhance it. (9) 
An effective way to start a cultural transformation is for a company to outline publicly a 
broad reason for its existence, and the values it intends to pursue. A ‘company purpose’ 
or ‘mission statement’, complemented by clear ‘corporate values’, can go a long way to 
establishing the correct climate inside the company—as long as its leadership walk-the-
talk. (9)
VI  SURVEY RESULTS
This research is supported by a small-scale sample survey using interviews 
(Appendix). A total of  fourteen executives were interviewed: four in the UK, six in 
the USA, one in Switzerland, one in Australia, and two in Canada (three British 
citizens, seven US, one German, one Swiss, one Australian, one Canadian). The 
interviews were conducted anonymously—see the Appendix. The results echo those 
of  Parker (2018), signalling a deep concern with the role of  corporations in society 
and an acceleration of  the pace of  change in corporate activity in seeking to  promote 
 societal goals. 
It is worthwhile comparing these interview results with those of Parker (2018). 
There is great accord between the two sets of interviews, pointing to a change in the 
Zeitgeist of a significant cohort of business leaders. 
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VII  MECHANISMS OF CHANGE
The research underlying this report suggests that there has been an acceleration in 
the pace of change of corporations recognising societal values: 
Regulation is absolutely necessary. (1)
Companies are increasingly losing the understanding of where they add value to society. 
(5)
Distance and intermediaries [in supply] chains can put barriers on the way of monitor-
ing but it is essential to provide sufficient means to achieve the goals of an impeccable 
supply chain. Companies should enlist the help of government bodies and NGOs to 
achieve this. (5)
Several key mechanisms of change have been identified:
1. New forms of transnational governance mechanisms
The ‘governance triangle’ depicted in Figure 5 highlights not only governance 
through the market and through state regulation (the two processes outlined 
at the beginning of this project) but also ‘governance through argumenta-
tion’—pressure from civil society. Corporations, NGOs, private regulators, 
and standards and accreditation bodies have come together to provide a 
means of corporate governance that acknowledges and pursues societal goals. 
This meshes direct policy initiatives of corporations with the demands of 
national governments and NGOs (Figure 6). Examples include: the Palm Oil 
Innovation Group and ISO 26000.
2. Consumer pressure
The rise of the ‘ethical consumer’ has profound effects on corporate behaviour. 
Through the adoption of standards, ethical norms are pursued throughout 
the supply chain and thus have a transnational impact. 
3. Pressure from civil society
It is not only as consumers that individuals and small groups can influence 
corporate behaviour. The ‘global war for talent’ (reference Arie Lewin) means 
that the ‘material generation’, who are generally more in favour of societal 
goals being pursued in business arenas, have strong preferences for joining 
‘ethical companies’. 
4. ‘Burdensome responsibility’
Evidence is needed on situations where corporations forgo profits for social 
goals. This needs careful experimental design in research. 
360 Peter J. Buckley
5. Stakeholders versus shareholders
Shareholders are becoming translated into stakeholders by sustainable 
 investing. Pressures for employees, consumers, and along the value chain are 
growing for the embodiment of social purpose into corporate behaviour 
(Friedman 1984). 
VIII POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Subsidies and taxes can influence the returns on investments in corporate social 
responsibility. The removal of such subsidies is likely to result in the reversion of such 
investments. (An example is the European subsidies to ‘renewable energy’ (Cassimon 
et al. 2014: 21).) Using the real-options framework, options to invest in positive social 
change can be improved by reducing the long-term uncertainty surrounding such 
investments. One way to do this is to encourage self-regulation by corporations— 
possibly in association with the public sector and NGOs. Examples include codes of 
conduct, compliance to standards, certification, and adherence to declarations such as 
‘shared value’. This not only increases option value, but it also builds public and 
 (a) Corporations (b) Civil society (c) States
 (market) (argumentation pressure) (coordination)
Targeted objective
(e.g., sustainability of rainforest)
Actions
 (a) Modify corporate (b) Supervision, (c) Regulatory
 strategy embodying compliance monitoring backing
 (b) and (a) (by NGOs)
Objective 
and
Unintended
consequences
Figure 6: ‘Governance triangle’ implementation.
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 consumer awareness and stakeholder buy-in to corporate strategy, ultimately increasing 
the value of corporations’ investment in social welfare. 
IX CONCLUSIONS
Richardson (1972: 884) describes ‘a dense network of cooperation and affiliation by 
which firms are inter-related’. Equally, we can envisage a dense network of regulations, 
codes, rules, and standards to which corporations have to conform. 
Corporations thus operate within a web of rules and signals. Only some of the 
rules emanate from governments—others are from compliance with standards, 
 customer expectations, supplier demands, and civil society norms. Signals come from 
all of the corporations’ stakeholders, not only expressed as price signals but also 
through means such as social movements, ownership changes, and lobbying. 
Corporations are not passive receivers of rules and signals; they also make them. 
Business organisations, collectively and individually, formulate rules and send signals 
to the rest of society.
Rules and signals vary by time and place. Rules evolve and signals mutate over 
time. Place and space are important. Where a corporations is domiciled and where its 
activities are located are crucial determinants of behaviour. Space between operations 
influences operations and behaviour as in cross-border trade and cross-cultural 
management.
Governance is determined by all the above influences. However, elements of 
 governance represent a crucial choice for the management of corporations. 
Government policy is not the sole determinant of governance modes, although it is an 
important one. The choice to go beyond what governments (all governments includ-
ing supranational ones) require is often made by corporations (and sometimes forced 
on them by the non-governmental pressures examined in this paper). The importance 
of company culture in this process is paramount and largely undisputed. The impact of 
specific incentives for managers to ‘do good’ is much more contested. 
We might, therefore, suggest a conceptual spectrum of corporations’ contributions 
to society (Table 4). The minimalist conception of doing social good is that simply by 
operating efficiently and maximising profits, corporations thereby fulfil all their con-
ceivable and feasible contributions to society. A more concerted effort can be made by 
corporate social responsibility activities, which range from ‘add-ons’ (contributions to 
charities) to attempting to disseminate value more widely through stakeholders and 
beyond by setting social goals. Corporations can undertake ‘burdensome responsibil-
ity’ by pursuing social goals that will negatively impact on their ‘bottom line’ and 
decrease (short-run) profitability. Finally, there are ‘outliers’: companies designed 
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with a social mission, social enterprises, and ‘principled organisation’ operated solely 
for social good. The current ecology of business includes a mix of all these ideal types. 
X FURTHER RESEARCH
This investigation suggests a wide range of opportunities for further research.
1. Gaps in existing knowledge:
• Conceptual clarity 
• Frameworks for analysis
• Does ‘normal governance’ include a social purpose (implicit?)
• Should governance include a social purpose?
• Measurement of key constructs of ‘social impact’ of business.
2. Overarching and recurring issues that corporations, policymakers, and 
 academics need to address
Corporations
• Clear statement and understanding of the purpose of the corporation.
• To achieve social goals? by culture or incentive?
• Compliance or positive pursuit of social goals?
• The role of employee involvement in CSR activities 
• How do companies reconcile multiple goals? (CSR goals and commercial 
goals)
Policymakers
• Clear definition of the responsibilities, rights, and fair treatment of 
corporations.
Academics
• Deep conversation on concepts and frameworks for the analysis of the inter-
action of corporations and ‘society’.
• Investigate the relationship between social investment and profitability. 
• Does the move away from a single clear metric (profitability) create problems 
in financing economic activity?
• Better models of investment in CSR, possible along ‘real-option’ lines. 
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• There are important and unresolved measurement issues in CSR.
• Empirical investigation: interview all stakeholders including labour bodies 
(unions, or the Trades Union Congress).
• The role of business school education in corporations’ role in society. 
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APPENDIX: SURVEY RESULTS
This research includes a small-scale survey (utilising interviews) of top executives in 
targetted companies (theoretical sampling).
The interviews yielded a large number of rich insights.
1. Chief executive of AIM listed PLC (UK) British citizen
Regulation is absolutely necessary.
Corporate governance is everything and this comes from the board. 
Incentives can be temporary.
Reputation is more important than culture.
Culture exists in pockets throughout the company—there is no overall, all-pervasive 
 corporate culture.
Market forces will force industry to adopt societal goals.
2. (2) Senior executive, international publishers (UK) US citizen
Designing incentives to ‘do good’ leads to complications—how are trade-offs managed? 
How do you trade-off ‘social benefit’ against increasing sales?
Visionary governments can invest in breakthrough technology to enhance societal goals 
that can provide incentives for private industry to invest and/or engage in public–private 
partnerships without actually regulating any industry or a specific societal goal and 
thereby disrupt the market conditions. Regulation will be possible only in accordance 
with the political ideology of voters.
3. Group managing director, Australian private company (Australia) Australian 
citizen
Must have adherence to formal standards (ISO), certification, and a quality system 
—‘Our quality journey’.
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CSR does not have the same impact as standards because it is harder to justify its impact 
on the bottom line.
We visit suppliers and make sure we are buying from suppliers who deliver quality.
We have an unwavering focus on our [employee] health programme—it has paid for 
itself. 
4. Chief executive of UK institutional investor (UK) UK citizen
The Friedman position is wrong—businesses should be pro-social and wealth creating.
Profits are like a social licence to operate.
A shift is going on in business and investment focus—away from a transactional world 
view to a relationship world view.
5. Consultant and former senior manager (Switzerland) Swiss citizen
Companies are increasingly losing the understanding of where they add value to society.
Distance and intermediaries [in supply] chains can put barriers on the way of monitor-
ing but it is essential to provide sufficient means to achieve the goals of an impeccable 
supply chain. Companies should enlist the help of government bodies and NGOs to 
achieve this.
Company culture comes from the original founder but is affected by market realities. 
Company cultures have to compete and to adapt. Cultures are exposed to competition, 
just like anything else.
Incentives can be given if the targets are clear enough.
Monitoring of the supply chain is becoming more crucial.
6. Retired vice president of major US multinational (US) German citizen
Doubtful that government bureaucracy can play an efficient and effective role in mandat-
ing and monitoring social responsibility/sustainability actions of private sector. However, 
a more appropriate role for the governments is to establish standards and mandate for 
public disclosure of such activities. This would go a long way towards enhancing 
 transparency around companies’ impact on society. 
Besides, there are plenty of good reasons for companies to act on their own: (i) business 
case for CSR—it enhances competiveness and company reputation; (ii) Wall Street 
investors pay attention; (iii) customers demand it; and (iv) employees—today’s young 
talent pool—are inspired, increasing employee retention and loyalty.
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Board oversight and proactive CEO engagement are essential. With proper leadership, 
resources, and employee buy-in, a favourable organisational culture and climate can be 
created.
7. Board member of major US multinational (US) American citizen
Government bureaucracies would probably not effectively carry out a regulatory frame-
work for ‘constraining’ corporations in this way; and I fear that the ‘law of unintended 
consequences’ would play out were such bureaucracies created and given a mandate. 
I also agree that corporations can and do put together a business case for corporate 
social responsibility and this is especially so if their activities under CSR can be aligned 
with their own business interests. A prime example of such alignment is the drive by 
Coca-Cola around the world to invest in clean water as such activities are in alignment 
with the need for Coke to have local clean water in order to manufacture and sell its 
product.
Again, the absolute best mechanism for a self-directed contribution is to discover and 
implement actions which align the interests of the corporation with the interests of 
 society such as the clean water initiative which has been made a part of the culture 
of Coca-Cola.
Critical need for the boards of directors and CEOs to drive the CSR initiatives from the 
top down.
8. Managing principal, US consultant (US) American citizen
I believe corporations can contribute and that many indeed do so. … While these 
 companies have many stakeholders to appease, they also look at societal issues as part of 
their mission and values.
This is debatable and as I do not believe there is one good answer that fits all situations.
Politics play an important role as well and could muddy the waters of good intentions. 
I believe contributions should come down to individuals making independent decisions 
with a supportive company culture of giving back to their communities. 
9. Retired CEO of major multinational (US) American citizen
It is sad and misleading to read the statement about corporations having ‘selfish’ goals, 
as if corporations are thoughtless individuals instead of organisations. Corporations 
employ people and, if industrial companies, they sustain many—sometimes hundreds or 
thousands—of families through suppliers and other value-chain networks. To call their 
goals ‘selfish’, brands all corporations with the stereotype of a few rotten corporate 
apples (which also exist in government, by the way); to do so perpetuates a harmful 
myth, very unfair to the many conscientious corporations that do good in the world.
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If a corporation is committed to contributing to societal goals, they will find ways to 
motivate and inspire their employees, suppliers, and customers to adapt to these values. 
The idea of monetary incentives could work, but monetary incentives in and of them-
selves are somewhat of a blunt motivational instrument. It would be much better to  create 
a culture that promotes social contributions, and hires employees who share that culture 
and want to do something to enhance it.
An effective way to start a cultural transformation is for a company to outline publicly a 
broad reason for its existence, and the values it intends to pursue. A ‘company purpose’ 
or ‘mission statement’, complemented by clear ‘corporate values’, can go a long way to 
establishing the correct climate inside the company—as long as its leadership 
walk-the-talk.
10. Retired chief executive officer of major multinational (US) American citizen
The CEO’s value system and or the competitive context plays a major role in deciding on 
the scope of the goal: shareholder only or multiple stakeholders. Usually it has been an 
external force (competition, activist groups, NGOs, customers, consumers, a very young 
and idealistic workforce, etc.) that has forced an organisation to adopt societal goals. 
A CEO’s value system has driven societal goals and they have been used as a differentiator 
in a market entry strategy into a competitive market, and sometimes it has been used 
successfully by an incumbent as a form of competitive advantage pre-emptively. 
The CEO’s value system which drives the value system of his management team. Clear and 
specific societal goals and incentives for the organisation to drive toward those societal 
goals. Clear management routines that incorporate progress toward societal goals. Strong 
economic arguments that derive from driving societal goals: making money is compatible 
with driving societal goals. Have to look beyond the obvious to make a strong business case. 
Small experiments to showcase wins. Start small and then scale. Understand that employees 
feel good by doing good and when employees feel good they are extremely productive.
11. Non-executive board member of major multinational (US) American citizen
I believe the answer to both questions is a ‘yes’. Some businesses, especially consumer- 
facing businesses clearly feel the pressure of the expectations from their consumer base 
that they should at a minimum do no harm to society. Their corporate reputation improves 
if they are seen as doing good for the society. These market forces naturally push the 
businesses to think about their societal impact and address the issues. The answer to the 
question is a yes for such companies for the reason that the consumers of some businesses 
put such pressures on them. The pressure could also come from NGOs or other players 
(activists, media, etc.) as well. To the extent this is felt as a threat to the business, the 
business will act to address it. 
I do not agree that businesses should be regulated to contribute to society. Regulation is 
needed at various levels. I believe we should have standards on water discharge,  emissions, 
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fundamental rights of the employees, etc. These are types of regulation that is already 
there to control the environmental and social footprint print of a business.
Businesses with an enlightened self-interest, which take a long-term view that their 
 existence depends in the existence of the societies in which they live will contribute to 
invest in their future, but such thinking isn’t too commonplace. This is a matter of leader-
ship and culture, a strong tone at the top and walking the talk. The culture need not be 
an altruistic one, it needs to be an enlightened one as mentioned above. If incentives are 
connected to such existential philosophy, they could be effective.
12. Consultant at major British consultancy firm (UK), UK citizen 
Some big insurance companies are leading in social investment, particularly those from 
continental Europe. People in key positions are pushing sustainability because they want 
to take a long-term view.
The European Commission High Level Expert Group are driving the agenda [on 
 sustainable investment] following the Paris Climate Change Convention. This is not yet 
legislation so much as potential legislation and persuasion.
Mark Carney [Governor of the Bank of England] is pushing for more climate impact 
disclosure in the reporting for public corporations. This is voluntary at the moment but 
many companies are taking it into account for investment, reporting and supply chain 
issues.
There is a lack of data to drive the agenda forward on climate change impact. There are 
more indexes and benchmarks beginning to appear on sustainability such as the Brookings 
Institution Global Impact Bands Database.
A number of trailblazers in sustainable investment exist such as Unilever’s commitment 
to the SDGs as ‘top of the leader board’.
Tax incentives help with sustainable investment such as the [2014] Social Investment 
Tax Relief [SITR]. Government backing for the Principles for Responsible Investment, 
as given by Teresa May is critical. Wider incentives obviously help.
The emergence and development of Special Impact Investment has been rapid. As of 
2017 there were 108 contracted Social Investment Bonds [SIBs] in 25 countries. The 
UK is the leader with 42.
Social Investment Banks such as Big Society Capital are poised to grow and become 
significant players.
A change in culture needs champions to drive it and it has to be a person of influence such 
as the Head of Strategy or Head of Investment in order to lead cultural change.
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13. Vice-president of investor relations, Canadian multinational corporation, 
American citizen 
CSR gives access to pockets of the market—revenue opportunities, particularly in 
Europe.
European companies require their whole supply chain to be up to CSR issues.
In the labour pool, millennials are very engaged. 
Incentives generate unintended consequences.
Younger people are agitators for more CSR.
Regulation brings in lawyers, auditors, etc.. results in minimal compliance.
It is better for companies to own being part of the community rather than minimal 
 [compliance] effort.
14. Chief executive officer of large multinational Canadian private company, 
Canadian citizen.
Ownership is not strategy.
We have 501 (c) 3 non-profit arm ‘[Company name] International Development’ with 
seventeen projects in thirteen countries—mainly African.
In 2013 we bought a satellite imaging company. This enables us to track green biomass. 
Entry into big data through our data platform. Direct, real-time advice to farmers.
Configuring the value chain—‘end-to-end’ view of internalisation. Transport/Packaging/
Standards.
The configuration of the value chain is important—we take an ‘end-to-end’ view of 
internalisation.
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